Distributed Early Worm Detection Based on Payload Histograms by 根元 義章
Distributed Early Worm Detection Based on
Payload Histograms
Yuji WAIZUMI, Masashi TSUJI, Hiroshi TSUNODA, Nirwan ANSARI†, and Yoshiaki NEMOTO
Graduate School of Information Sciences Tohoku University
Sendai–shi, Miyagi, 980–8579 Japan
† Advanced Neteworking Laboratory, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark, NJ07102, USA
Email: {wai, crossam, tsuno, nemoto}@nemoto.ecei.tohoku.ac.jp, † Nirwan.Ansari@NJIT.EDU
Abstract— Epidemic worms has become a social problem owing
to their potency in paralyzing the Internet, thus affecting our
way of life. Recent researches have pointed out that epidemic
worms can propagate similar payloads rapidly. It was shown
that it is possible to evaluate similarities between these payloads
in terms of a 256-dimensional vector based on histograms of the
appearance frequencies of 256 character codes. This observation
has also been confirmed by our earlier works. However, this
method, if applied to flows from only one network, which means
a network managed by an independent organization, is prone to
a high rate of false positives in cases such as when normal emails
are sent through a mailing list. To overcome this problem, we
propose a new scheme which checks for any similarity between
flows detected at several IDSs in a distributed environment. The
proposed scheme is based on the fact that normal payloads prop-
agating from different networks are different, whereas in the case
of epidemic worms payloads even propagated through different
networks but generated by the same worm exhibit similarity.
We have demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed scheme
through extensive experiments using real network traffic that
contains worms.
Keywords— Similarity of Payload, Clustering, Flow, Dis-
tributed IDS
I. INTRODUCTION
The pervasiveness of epidemic worms has severely affected
the normal proper operation of the Internet, resulting in
insurmountable economic loss, homeland and national security
threats, and possibly social dysfunction. Ironically, advances in
networking technologies are furthering the rapid propagation
of worms, exacerbating the threat to the integrity of the Inter-
net. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) have been introduced
to detect such worms, and can be classified into signature
based detection systems and anomaly detection systems. Sig-
nature based detection such as snort [1] can detect worms
with high accuracy. However, most signatures are developed
manually, and are time consuming. In addition, polymorphic
worms are severely undermining the signature development
task. Therefore, sophisticated intrusions can incite a significant
damage to the Internet before signatures are developed. On the
other hand, anomaly based detection [2]–[8], which detects
worms based on the deviation from normal behavior, can
detect unknown worms before signatures are developed. How-
ever, this approach tends to generate more false positives and
is not effective in mitigating worms’ catastrophic detriment
to the Internet. Therefore, anomaly-based detection is viable
only if worms can be detected with few false positives.
Worms can be classified into two types, those infecting
random hosts, and those invading specific hosts, respectively.
The former such as scan worms is known to scan many
random IP addresses searching for victim hosts [9]. Hence,
such worms can be detected by uncovering scans. However,
the later, which propagated by emails, selects victim hosts
by using address lists, and it is thus difficult to detect such
worms. Although a method to detect these worms based on
the number of DNS queries has been proposed [10], it is only
effective in detecting mass mailing worms. Note that flow
payloads ( a flow payload is the aggregated payload of all
packets in a TCP connection) generated by the same worm are
similar because worms copy and propagate themselves through
the Internet[11]. Since many worms exhibit this property
regardless of their propagation method, similarity of payloads
can be used to detect worms. Although substring matching
has been proposed to find similarity of payloads, searching
substrings is computationally expensive. Therefore, we need
to develop an efficient means to determine similarity of flow
payloads.
Flow payloads generated by legitimate emails and dis-
tributed through an email list also exhibit similarity that may
be falsely detected as worms, i.e., false positives. However,
these flows which have similar payloads are not likely gener-
ated from different networks at the same time, whereas flows
having similar payloads transmitted from the same kind of
worms can be observed over different networks at the same
time. Therefore, methods based on the similarity of payloads
have to take heed of such similarity over a number of networks
to distinguish legitimate flows from worm flows.
In this paper, we propose a distributed system for early
worm detection based on similarity of flow payloads. The
remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents related works. In Section III, we discuss our
investigation on the similarity of flow payloads upon which
our proposed scheme, a distributed worm detection system,
is developed and described in Section IV. Evaluation of the
proposed system is presented in Section V. Finally, concluding
remarks are given in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORKS
It is especially critical to be able to detect worms which
can spread rapidly throughout the Internet, in a timely fashion.
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Signature-based IDSs which are configured with a number of
signatures have generally been adopted to detect these worms.
However, since developing the signatures is time-consuming,
a new worm can exert a significant damage to the Internet
before signatures are developed. Therefore, we will focus on
anomaly-based IDS which does not need to generate signatures
for individual worms.
Some studies [9], [12], [13] have been conducted to model
the spreading process of a worm, in particular, how worms
scan the Internet for vulnerabilities. These studies estimate the
time-evolution of the number of hosts which will be infected
by means of a set of recursive equations expressed in terms
of the number of hosts which are already infected and the
number of hosts which exhibit vulnerabilities. These studies
also estimate the time it takes to detect the worm spread-
ing activities based on unused IP addresses. A relationship
between available IP addresses and the detection time has
been established. These studies provide a general principle
for modeling and analyzing the worm spreading process that
may be applied for worm detection, but it remains a critical
challenge to detect rapidly spread worms.
A number of proposals [14]–[16] have been reported to
detect worms which scan for random IP addresses. However,
they are ineffective in detecting worms which extract addresses
from mailing lists, such as email address lists, from infected
hosts, and do not scan for random IP addresses. To address
this issue, two approaches which take advantages of DNS
queries [10], [17] have been reported. Reference [17] considers
communications without DNS queries as anomalous based on
the assumption that normal communications always involve
DNS queries. This method is useful to detect worms which
gather information of their targets by scanning without DNS
queries. The approach is not effective in detecting worms
which sending emails by using MX queries. Detection of
worms, which send emails via MX queries, was subsequently
addressed by [10]. MX queries are usually transmitted from
email servers. This approach detects MX queries from non-
server hosts as worm spreading activities because client hosts
seldom send MX queries. The approach has some drawbacks;
it cannot P2P traffic, and emails from a client host running an
email server program can be falsely detected as worms.
It has been pointed out that payloads of worms are similar
to each other [11]. Based on this fact, some detection meth-
ods [11], [18] have been proposed to detect communications
which have similar payloads as worm spreading activities
by monitoring similar payloads sent from a large number of
different hosts. However, these methods are required to match
common parts of payloads included in the communications to
evaluate their similarities, and are thus very time-consuming
because a payload may have multiple common parts [19].
Matching of multiple signatures is required to achieve high
detection accuracy [20], hence resulting in a long detection
delay especially when the flow length and packet size are
large. For this reason, these methods are used to develop worm
detection signatures rather than to detect worms early.
Non-worm flow payloads with high similarity pose another
challenge. For example, as emails distributed through mailing
lists that exhibit similarity may be detected as worm flows,
i.e., false positives. In this paper, we will tackle this issue
by minimizing the false positive rate. Our approach is based
on the observation that it is very rare that similar payloads
of non-worm flows are transmitted from different networks
at the same time. For instance, it is unlikely that the same
email messages are transmitted simultaneously from different
organizations. Flow payloads of worm flows that exhibit
similarity can, however, be transmitted from infected hosts in
different organizations at the same time. Thus, we propose a
new distributed worm detection system based on the similarity
of flows observed over different networks.
III. DISTINCTION OF WORM FLOWS BY SIMILARITY OF
CODE HISTOGRAMS
A worm makes several copies of itself, and then propagates
by sending these copies to other hosts. During worm propaga-
tions, a large number of similar payloads can be observed in
a short span of time. However, it is rather rare to have similar
payloads in a short time in normal traffic. By taking these
two facts into consideration, several worm detection systems
that rely on finding similar payloads have been proposed [19],
[20]. However, the similarity evaluation methods carried out
by these systems are inefficient because these method require
matching multiple signatures to payloads.
In this section, we propose an efficient similarity evaluation
method which breaks a payload into units of 8 bits each. It then
evaluates the similarity of payloads based on the histograms
obtained by counting the occurrence frequencies of 256 codes.
A. A Payload Similarity Evaluation Method based on the
Similarity of Code Histograms
Reference [6]–[8] consider a flow payload as a set of 8-
bit codes, in terms of occurrence frequencies of 256 codes
expressed as a vector h as shown in (1).
h = (h0, h1, h2, · · · , h255) (1)
Flows with payload histograms deviated from the normal
payload histogram are considered anomalous. These methods
are effective in detecting worms propagated through services
such as HTTP requests which have similar contents. However,
in case of worms propagated via services such as SMTP which
may carry attached files encoded in MIME, it is difficult to
accurately define the normal state. Nevertheless, these methods
are effective in evaluating the similarity of payloads.
Fig. 1(a) depicts the histogram of the flow payload of two
flows generated by a Beagle.AV worm, which is detected
by using the Bleeding Snort signatures [21]. The payload
carries an attached file which is encoded by using MIME.
All the worms used in this paper are detected by using
the Bleeding snort signatures. Fig. 1(a) and 1(b) illustrate
sample payload histograms of a the two Beagle.AV and normal
payloads, respectively. The two Beagle.AV histograms are
almost totally overlapped as shown in Fig. 1(a), whereas the
histograms of normal payloads differ from each other. From
these histograms, we can conclude that it is possible to detect
worms by sorting similar payloads.
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(a) Histogram of Beagle.AV.
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(b) Histogram of normal Email.
Fig. 1. Histograms of worm and normal flows.
As a measure of evaluating the similarity of two payload his-
tograms expressed by vectors , hi and hj , we use the distance
measure (D(hi,hj)) between these two vectors expressed as
D(hi,hj) =
255∑
k=0
(hi,k − hj,k)2, (2)
where hi,k, hj,k denote the kth element of hi and hj , respec-
tively.
By using this method, it is possible to express the payload of
a flow in terms of a vector h. Payload similarity between two
flows can be evaluated by merely determining the distance be-
tween the two h vectors. As opposed to methods which extract
common portions from worm payloads, payload similarity can
be evaluated by this method more efficiently.
B. Payload Similarity Evaluation based on the Distance Be-
tween two h vectors
Fig. 2 illustrates the distances between 1) a reference worm
flow and other flows of the same kind of worm, 2) a reference
worm flow and normal flows, and 3) a reference normal flow
and other normal flows. The vertical axis shows distances
between the reference flow and samples, and they are sorted.
From Fig. 2, it is clear that the distances between worms of
the same family are small, whereas the distances from normal
flows to other normal flows and worm flows are both large.
Thus, we conclude that it is possible to evaluate the similarity
of communication contents quantitatively, and to distinguish
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Fig. 2. Distances between h vectors among warm–warm, warm–normal,
normal–normal flows.
worms from normal communications by using the distances
between the histograms h. However, we can also observe
large distances between worm payloads for worms of the
same family. We conjecture that the h vectors are distributed
in multiple clusters due to changes of payload portions. We
shall next investigate the validity of the conjecture through
clustering.
IV. A DISTRIBUTED WORM DETECTION METHOD BASED
ON SIMILARITY OF CODE HISTOGRAMS
A. Outline of the Proposed Method
We have demonstrated in the previous section that worms
can be detected by payload similarity of flows. Belows are,
however, some normal traffics which may exhibit high simi-
larity.
• mailing list (SMTP)
• same content from a local web server (HTTP,HTTPS)
• requests to same web pages (HTTP,HTTPS)
• a request for mails to a mail server which does not
contains the mails (POP, IMAP)
• server responses to incorrect logins (FTP,SSH)
These traffics, whose payloads contain the same mail mes-
sages, same web contents, same host names, and so on, may
be detected as worms because of their highly similar payloads.
It is, however, rare that a large number of flows, which
have highly similar payloads are transmitted from networks of
different organizations in a short period of time. Worms, on the
other hand, can spread to networks of different organizations
at the same time. Consequently, distances among h’s of non-
worm flows which are transmitted from different networks are
usually large although distances among h’s observed in one
network are small. In other words, vectors h’s of worm flows
of the same kind are very similar and have small distances even
though the worms are transmitted from different networks.
Therefore, we can distinguish non-worm flows from worm
flows by evaluating similarities of cluster means, which are
calculated from similar h’s detected in each network, from
different networks.
Here, we propose a new distributed worm detection system
based on payload similarities. The system consists of multiple
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Fig. 3. Overview of the proposed system.
IDSs which monitor the occurrence of flows with similar
payloads in each network, and collects mean vectors which
are calculated using h’s of similar flows detected by each IDS.
If the mean vectors m’s, which are sent from each IDS, have
high similarity, the proposed system considers the vectors h’s
from which the mean vectors m’s are calculated as vectors
derived from worms.
Fig. 3 shows the architecture of the proposed system which
consists of Local Detectors (LDs) which identify flows with
similar payloads in each LAN, and a Global Detector (GD)
which distinguishes worm flows from non-worm flows based
on the collected m’s from LDs. First, each LD discovers
similar flows based on distances among h’s by clustering. In
the case that an LD detects similar flows, the LD send the
mean vector of the detected similar flows to the GD. Then,
the GD evaluates the similarity of the mean vectors transmitted
from each LD by clustering. In the case that the mean vectors
belong to only one cluster, the GD considers multiple similar
flows have been transmitted from different networks, and thus
considers these flow as worms.
B. Operations of Local Detectors
An LD consists of a histogram generation module and a
clustering module (Fig. 4), and detects flows which have
similar payloads as worm candidates. The histogram gener-
ation module generates a vector h from the histogram of
the occurrence frequencies of 256 character codes of a flow,
and sends it to the clustering module. The clustering module
monitors the occurrence of similar flows by applying the
following clustering algorithm to h’s.
begin
i← argmini′(D(h,mi′))
if D(h − mi) < th
then mc ← mi · (ni − 1)/ni + h/ni
else mc ← h c← c+ 1
end
Here, n and c denote the number of elements in a cluster and
the number of clusters, respectively. mi is the mean vector of
the vectors in cluster i, and D(h,mi) is defined by (2).
An LD sends the mean vector mi to the GD when the
number of flows belonging to the cluster represented by mi
Histgram
Generator
Histgram
Vector
(h)
Clustering
Module
Network
Traffic
Similarity
Information
(Mean Vectors)
Alert
Global 
Detector
Fig. 4. Architecture of the Local Detector.
TABLE I
DETECTION ACCURACY OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM.
Detection rate(%) Number of false positives
LD1(LAN1) 100 794
LD2(LAN2) 100 480
GD(LAN1+2) 100 47
becomes two for early detection. Two is used because the
number of mean vectors sent to the GD can be enormous
if the mean vector is sent each time when a similar flow is
observed. When the number of cluster c exceeds a threshold
cmax, the mean vector which represents the oldest cluster is
deleted to keep the buffer size manageable.
C. Operations of Global Detector
The GD detects flows generated from LANs in a short
period of time with similar histograms by clustering the mean
vectors m sent from each LD. The clustering algorithm is the
same as that used by an LD. If the number of the mean vectors
belonging to a cluster is more than 1, the GD considers this
phenomenon is caused by the occurrence of a worm, and sends
alerts to the LDs which sent the mean vectors to the GD.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Experimental Environment
In our experiment, we have used one day’s traffic observed
in two LANs which have about 50 hosts each. Approximately
11,000 TCP flows are used for the experiment. We adopt
Beagle.AV as the worm traffic which is detected by snort in
LAN1 and LAN2. The local detectors (LDs) in LAN1 and
LAN2 are denoted as LD1 and LD2, respectively.
B. Evaluation of Detection Accuracy of Proposed System
The detection accuracy of our proposed system is summa-
rized in Table I. The detection rate of LD1, LD2 and GD are
100%. The number of false positives generated by the GD is
less than one tenth of the number of false positives of LD1
and LD2; our proposed system can significantly minimize the
false positives. This result validates our assumption that non-
worm flows exhibiting high similarity are not transmitted from
networks of different organizations.
The GD does produce some false positives caused by short
messages whose payloads have little variation, such a GET
requests of HTTP, keep alive messages, and so on. GET
requests of HTTP to popular servers, such as search engines,
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TABLE II
COMPARISON WITH OTHER APPROACHES
Unknown False Detection
Detection Positives Speed
Signature-base IDS No Low Middle
Common Parts-base IDS Yes High Low
Proposed System Yes Low High
are likely to be similar and can be detected as worms even
if they are transmitted from extraneous users. One of our
pending works will consider a statistical approach to mitigate
the effect of this type of messages, as a pre-processing step to
our proposed system. Hence, the false positive rate is expected
to be lowered much further.
C. Comparison with Other Approaches
A comparison of our proposed system with other approaches
is summarized in table II. Signature-based approaches can
detect known worms by predefined signatures but cannot
detect unknown worms. The detection speed highly depends
on the number of signatures and the length of worm flows.
Since this approach needs to match signatures to the entire
flow of a worm, the detection speed is inversely proportional
to the flow length. The computational complexity is O(NL),
where, N is the number of signatures and L is the length of
worm flows; L is usually larger than 1000 bytes. Bayesian-
signature approaches [19], [20] can detect unknown worms
but the number of false positives is significantly larger than
that of our proposed method because this approach contains
only local detectors without GD of our proposed system. This
approach need multiple signatures for each worm to achieve
high detection accuracy, and thus its detection speed is lower
than the signature-based approaches.
Our proposed system can detect unknown worm flows with
low false positives because of the distributed architecture.
Since our proposed method calculates distances in the 256-
dimensional space, the complexity to evaluate the flow similar-
ity is fixed, O(256N), and is less than that of signature-based
approaches.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed a new distributed worm
detection system which can detect unknown worms at high
speed and with low false positives. Our proposed system is
based on the assumption that payloads of non-worm flows
which are transmitted from networks managed by different
organizations are different, and payloads of worm flows are
similar because worms send their copies to infect other hosts.
To evaluate the similarity, we use 256-dimensional vectors
to express payloads of flows, and evaluate the distances
between these vectors. By clustering these vectors, we have
also conrmed that similar dlows do belong to same clusters,
and most clusters contain either all worm flows or all non-
worm flows.
We have demonstrated via a testbed consisting of about 100
hosts that our proposed system can achieve high detection
accuracy with a low false positive rate. The culprit for these
false positives is the highly similar flows generated by short
messages such as leep alive messages. Our future effort will
aim to further reduce the false positive rate.
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